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Ordinariness as Equality* 
ELISE C. BODDIE† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay argues for an equality norm of racial ordinariness. Ordinariness here 
refers to the state of being treated as a full, complex person and a rightful recipient 
of human concern.1 As a norm, its purpose is to focus constitutional attention on 
common, everyday interactions as sources of racial indignity.2 It also seeks to sensi-
tize courts and other constitutional actors to the infinite varieties and grittier dimen-
sions of discrimination through the “understandings of everyday folk.”3  
It may seem odd to think of ordinariness as a matter of racial equality. But 
consider the following speech by Frederick Douglass in 1865.4 Asked “what to do 
with the negro,” Douglass responded in part as follows:  
All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone! 
If you see him on his way to school, let him alone,—don’t disturb him! 
If you see him going to the dinner table at a hotel, let him go! If you see 
him going to the ballot box, let him alone!—don’t disturb him! If you see 
him going into a workshop, just let him alone,—your interference is 
doing him positive injury.5 
Douglass’s plea reveals the vastness of discrimination and how it seeped through the 
crevices of everyday life.6 His request for freedom in the everyday—to be able to go 
to school, dine, vote, work, just to be—spoke to a desire to live as an ordinary person, 
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 1. This definition is analogous to what Iris Marion Young has described as two general 
values of the “good life”: “participating in determining one’s action and the conditions of one’s 
action” and “developing and exercising one’s capacities and expressing one’s experience.” 
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 37 (1990). Ordinariness is also 
similar to what Kenneth Karst has described as a right of belonging and “to be treated by 
organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.” Kenneth Karst, The 
Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977). 
 2. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2004). 
 3. Charles Jones, Why Not Freedom?, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1063, 1068 (1999). 
 4. See Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-Minorities and Racegoating Dynamics of the Anti-
Affirmative-Action Position: From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
445, 481 (2003). 
 5. Id. at 481 & n.175 (quoting Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An 
Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865), in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS 
PAPERS 59, 68 (John W. Blasingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991)). Turner writes that 
“Douglass was criticizing a contract-labor system established and enforced by the general in 
Louisiana in which freed slaves were forced to work on plantations.” Id. at 481 n.175. 
 6. Cf. Jones, supra note 3, at 1069. 
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unencumbered by racial stigma and by the status of subordination and “otherness” 
that engulfed black people.  
This Essay embraces the same demand for ordinariness that Frederick Douglass 
expressed over a century and a half ago. Its primary concern is the lived experiences 
of race for black people and the quiet trauma that comes from being the persistent 
object of societal fear7 and resentment.8 To be denied ordinariness is to be shrouded 
in stereotypes and assumptions in an abstracted identity that is never fully one’s 
own.9 These experiences can take the form of subtler indignities that erode the self. 
In the extreme, they can be life altering or lead to death.10  
As I have indicated, ordinariness as a measure of equality is not a new concept. 
This Essay’s goal is to surface some of what has been said about it already in consti-
tutional discourse, but has never been fully heard. For instance, by its terms, Brown 
v. Board of Education11 declared unconstitutional segregation in public education.12 
But it was understood and celebrated by blacks at the time for its promise of ordinar-
iness13 and the hope that the decision would bring freedom from the daily encum-
brances and stigma of race. In the years after Brown, some civil rights litigants took 
up this claim more directly and framed their demands for equality explicitly through 
the lens of ordinariness.14 The idea of ordinariness as a form of equality also surfaced 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. See JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 81–101 (1997); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF 
CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND 
OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 1–13 (1998). 
 8. See generally Steven A. Tuch & Michael Hughes, Whites’ Racial Policy Attitudes in 
the Twenty-First Century: The Continuing Significance of Racial Resentment, 634 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 134 (2011) (discussing the persistence of white racial resentment 
against African Americans). Kenneth Karst makes a similar point about the complexity of 
white resentment, suggesting that such resentment is grounded in shame and guilt over blacks’ 
historical subjugation and mistreatment. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. 
REV. 245, 268 (1983) (“About twenty years ago, in casual conversation, my friend Vaughn 
Ball put this idea in words I shall never forget: ‘You can always forgive people for what they 
do to you, but you can never forgive them for what you do to them.’”). 
 9. See Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 809. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 12. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic 
Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1334 (2004) (“Brown sought to 
eliminate segregation in schools and thereby ensure that educational opportunity would not be 
rationed according to race.”). 
 13. I heard Brown described this way by those who lived through the era of state-enforced 
segregation at a celebration of the decision’s sixtieth anniversary. LDF Commemorates 60th 
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC. (May 
16, 2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/naacp-legal-defense-fund-commemorates-
60th-anniversary-brown-v-board-education [https://perma.cc/N4ES-Q2DG]; see also 
Maksymilian Del Mar, Exemplarity and Narrativity in the Common Law Tradition, 25 LAW 
& LITERATURE 390, 396 (2013) (“[O]rdinariness . . . [is] what a black kid ought to expect on 
arriving at a school door in Little Rock, Arkansas, after Brown v. Board of Education struck 
down racial segregation.” (quoting JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, 
LIFE 5–6 (2002))). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
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more obliquely in a smattering of constitutional cases from the 1970s and 1980s, 
principally in dissents by Justice Marshall.15 From there the trail disappears in race 
cases, though it has emerged more recently in Justice Kennedy’s opinions in 
Obergefell v. Hodges16 and Romer v. Evans,17 finding for plaintiffs challenging dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  
Part I explains why ordinariness matters and the importance of everyday interac-
tions to achieving ordinariness. It discusses these points through the lens of a true 
story about the shooting death of a black man by the police.18 Part II discusses court 
opinions that have identified ordinariness, either explicitly or implicitly, as a form of 
equality. Part III discusses the Fourth Amendment as one example of how constitu-
tional doctrine denies ordinariness. The Essay closes with a brief discussion of the 
challenges and possibilities of ordinariness as a constitutional norm. 
I. WHY ORDINARINESS MATTERS 
Consider the following true story: 
In July 2016, Philando Castile, a black man, was shot and killed in his car by a 
Latino police officer in St. Paul, Minnesota, during a traffic stop.19 The officer stated 
that Castile looked like someone who was a robbery suspect,20 though he used the 
pretext of a broken taillight to pull Castile over. Castile, who was a supervisor of a 
local school cafeteria,21 was driving home with his girlfriend and her four-year-old 
daughter after buying groceries. After Castile volunteered that he had a gun in the 
car, the officer shot him, reportedly because he feared that Castile was reaching for 
it and because he smelled marijuana in the car.22 Castile’s girlfriend insisted that 
Castile was reaching for his identification, which the officer had requested moments 
before he shot him.23  
This is the narrative that surfaces in several online searches about Castile’s death. 
But it misses an important piece of the story. Between July 2002 and July 2016, 
Castile was stopped by the police at least forty-six times—only six of which were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. Id.  
 16. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 17. 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 18. The idea of ordinariness explored in this Essay originated in an opinion piece that I 
wrote for the New York Times. See Elise C. Boddie, Philando Castile and the Terror of an 
Ordinary Day, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/opinion 
/philando-castile-and-the-terror-of-an-ordinary-day.html [https://perma.cc/7W38-N9YF]. 
 19. John Bowden, Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Found Not Guilty, HILL 
(June 16, 2017, 4:29 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/338193-police-officer-who-
shot-philando-castile-found-not-guilty-report [https://perma.cc/UCB3-YVAA]. 
 20. Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said About the 
Shooting, WASH. POST (June 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation 
/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officer-who-shot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting 
[https://perma.cc/NE9Q-ZV29]. 
 21. Melissa Chan, Philando Castile Was a Role Model to Hundreds of Kids, Colleagues 
Say, TIME (July 7, 2016), http://time.com/4397086/minnesota-shooting-philando-castile-role-
model-school [https://perma.cc/7DXU-K2R3]. 
 22. Berman, supra note 20. 
 23. Id. 
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for offenses that an officer could have observed prior to the stop.24 As a result, Castile 
reportedly accumulated $6000 in fines and tickets, which he struggled to pay.25  
Could these repeated interactions with the police have stigmatized Castile? 
Stigma refers to what R.A. Lenhardt has described as the state of being “a disfavored 
or dishonored individual in the eyes of society.”26 Stigma imposes a “virtual social 
identity”27 that shrouds its subjects in racial abstractions and preconceived social 
judgments. Because stigma prevents persons from participating in society on fully 
equal terms, it is a significant barrier to ordinariness. When stigma is internalized, it 
corrupts one’s sense of self.28 W.E.B. Du Bois famously framed this as a struggle 
that “yields [black persons] no true self-consciousness, but only lets [them see them-
selves] through the revelation of the other world.”29 As a result of this “twoness,” 
one is “always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s 
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”30 Thus, ra-
cially stigmatized persons are not only externally diminished by social judgments but 
also become agents of their own debasement.31  
To unpack this point let us consider how Castile’s experience of being stopped 
forty-six times could have burdened his daily experiences of driving to work, driving 
home, and while running errands, as he was doing the day he was killed. Did the 
possibility of being pulled over occupy his thoughts as he was driving?  Did he plan 
how he would respond—what he would say and how he would act if the police 
stopped him again?  Did he ever feel demeaned or humiliated by the police in prior 
stops?  And, if so, did the sight of a police car make him anxious or fearful?   
I ask these questions to illustrate that what many take for granted—the casual, 
mundane experience of driving—for Castile may have been a source of daily trauma 
that corroded his dignity and freedom. His repeated prior interactions with the police 
may have led him to internalize the experiences of being a perpetual suspect.32 This 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Eyder Peralta & Cheryl Corley, The Driving Life and Death of Philando Castile, NPR 
(July 15, 2016, 4:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/15/485835272 
/the-driving-life-and-death-of-philando-castile [https://perma.cc/V3XL-A566] (observing 
that of the forty-six stops, “only six of them were things a police officer would notice from 
outside a car—things like speeding or having a broken muffler”). 
 25. Id. These facts suggest that Castile was subject to multiple predatory systems—often 
facilitated by constitutional law— that trap poor people of color. See Devon W. Carbado, From 
Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police 
Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 129 (2017) [hereinafter Carbado, From Stopping Black 
People]; see also Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245 
(2010); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002) 
[hereinafter Carbado, (E)racing]. 
 26. See Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 809. 
 27. E.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 
2 (1963). 
 28. See Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 841–42 (fully exploring this dynamic). 
 29. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 2 (1994). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 818 n.55 (“The idea that one’s racial group ‘is, in fact, less 
worthwhile, deserving, or valuable than other social groups or collective identities’ leads to 
the inexorable conclusion that one’s personal identity may be similarly flawed.”). 
 32. See Carbado, (E)racing, supra note 25, at 966 (describing the burdens associated with 
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might explain why on that day he volunteered to the officer that he had a gun, leading 
the officer (who stated that he thought Castile was reaching for it) in turn to shoot 
him. In listening to his interactions with the officer on the dashcam video,33 it appears 
that Castile was trying to avoid surprising the officer and calmly to reassure him that 
he was not only complying with but submitting to the officer’s authority.34 This pur-
poseful demeanor may have reflected lessons that he had learned in his earlier en-
counters with the police. 
These final moments of Castile’s life demonstrate the troubling possibilities of 
stigma. The shadow identity that stigma imposes is costly to dignity, but in the con-
text of interactions with the police it can be the difference between life and death.35 
The officer sought to justify the shooting by claiming that Castile was reaching for 
his gun. Seconds before, however, the officer had asked Castile to produce his li-
cense.36 Would the officer have made the decision to fire shots into the car at close 
range within a matter of seconds had Castile been white?37 Or would he have given 
a white man the benefit of the doubt that he was reaching for his license, rather than 
for a weapon? This is the power and tragedy of stigma. It leaves no margin for error 
in interactions with the police, but it also inevitably shades those very interactions 
with mutual fear and suspicion. In Castile’s case the harms are compounded:  the 
loss of daily freedom he may have experienced in the years before his death and the 
final injustice of his death itself.   
I offer Castile’s story as an example of the denial of ordinariness. His story shows 
how everyday actions, such as driving down a street, can without warning imperil 
the dignity, or even the lives, of black people. Though they may unfold in an instant 
                                                                                                                 
 
racialized suspicion, including “internalized racial obedience toward, and fear of, the police” 
and the performance). Carbado writes that  
[P]eople of color are socialized into engaging in particular kinds of performances 
for the police. They work their identities in response to, and in an attempt to 
preempt, law enforcement discipline. This identity work takes place in a social 
atmosphere of fear and loathing. It is intended to signal acquiescence and respect-
ability. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
 33. In the dashcam video of the incident, Castile can be heard to say calmly, “I do have 
to tell you I do have a firearm on me.” Newsy, Dashcam Video of Castile Released, YOUTUBE 
(June 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLGRv8bWDks [https://perma.cc 
/8BTM-S8M6]. 
 34. See Carbado, (E)racing, supra note 25, at 946. 
 35. This problem is so pervasive that New Jersey legislators have proposed legislation to 
require schools to advise schoolchildren on how to interact with the police. Jacqueline L. Urgo, 
Black Lives Balks as NJ Lawmaker Wants To Legislate ‘The Talk,’ PHILA. INQUIRER (July 3, 
2017, 5:28 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/new_jersey/black-lives-balks-as-n-j-
lawmaker-wants-to-legislate-the-talk-20170703.html [https://perma.cc/Z272-P448]. 
 36. Jay Croft, Philando Castile Shooting: Dashcam Video Shows Rapid Event, CNN 
(June 21, 2017, 10:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/20/us/philando-castile-shooting-
dashcam/index.html [https://perma.cc/5XDG-CPY4]. 
 37. See Kelly McEvers, Video Captures Police Encounter with Murder Suspect, NPR 
(Mar. 23, 2017, 4:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/03/23/521274629/video-captures-police-
encounter-with-murder-suspect [https://perma.cc/S82U-DAAS] (describing encounter be-
tween a white cop and an aggressive white murder suspect that ends with no shots fired). 
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these experiences can be deeply debilitating.38 When they go badly, they jeopardize 
ordinariness by producing and reinforcing stigma. There are broader social harms 
too, as these experiences are shared with the victim’s friends and family, 
“spreading the psychological costs”39 of the incident and further jeopardizing the 
possibilities for developing social trust. Lingering fears and anxieties about the 
risk, consistent with history40 and experience, of being racially demeaned, 
harassed, and even endangered at a moment’s notice corrode the sense of self and 
social bonds across racial groupings. These fears and anxieties help to explain the 
desire for ordinariness:  the experience of belonging; of being treated as a 
multidimensional person and a rightful subject of human concern; and the 
presumption of legitimacy and innocence, conferred on whites often as a matter of 
course, that the status of ordinariness entails.  
Recall the hopes for ordinariness expressed by blacks following Brown. We can 
imagine that the harms of school segregation in the Brown era lay not simply in 
the denial of educational opportunity, but also in how it undermined and distorted 
interactions across race in the ordinary spaces of classrooms, hallways, and 
playgrounds. The promise of integration was that schools would become places 
where children would learn to get along (or not) by working through the 
practicalities of difference. In these spaces children could disagree and reconcile 
their dissimilarities, develop meaningful or casual friendships, or discover that they 
really did not like each other at all—not based on race or in spite of race, but in 
full view of race.41 The possible benefits of integration lay in allowing students to 
experience their shared humanity, to see racial differences as part of that humanity 
and to engage through these differences rather than fearing and resenting them. 
When students “connect[] through difference and Otherness”42 across racial lines, 
it reduces stigma:  “the racial other” passes out of existence and the “two selves” 
that Du Bois described become one.   
I emphasize the significance of embracing racial difference to make clear that 
the demand for ordinariness is not a call for colorblindness or a claim for sameness, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW 
PROFESSOR 45 (1992) (Williams describes her experience of being barred from a store by a 
white sales clerk: “In the flicker of his judgmental gray eyes, that saleschild had transformed 
my brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to shambles. He snuffed my 
sense of humanitarian catholicity, and there was nothing I could do to snuff his, without 
making a spectacle of myself.”).  
 39. JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS 
EXPERIENCE 24 (1994). 
 40. The experiences of everyday discrimination have a long lineage. Isabel Wilkerson, in 
her moving account of the Great Migration, details the daily injustices heaped on black people 
as a matter of social custom. See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: 
THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010). 
 41. Cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of 
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2009) (“Recognizing how intimate affiliations 
affect opportunities and status hierarchies, both in the intimate sphere and beyond, points us 
toward new ways to intervene in the persistent problem of discrimination.”). 
 42. Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmán, Personal Reflection on 50 Years of Loving: Creating 
Spaces of Differences by Demanding “The Right to Opacity,” 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 637, 638 
(2017). 
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universality, or assimilation. Equality can be confused with these objectives,43 but 
the logic of ordinariness rejects both. Iris Marion Young observes that seeking 
sameness and universalism creates social division, because no group of people is 
ever completely similar or completely different.44 Yet the inability to achieve 
complete sameness incentivizes those in the dominant culture to create 
“dichotomous hierarchical oppositions” that produce social outsiders by rendering 
them “good/bad” and “normal/deviant.”45 Ordinariness repudiates the goal of 
transcending difference.46 Instead it embraces the “positivity of group 
differences”47 and “equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups 
who mutually respect one another and affirm one another in their differences.”48 
Treating difference as the norm, rather than the exception, allows persons of color 
to be understood as complex, multidimensional human beings.49 It allows them, in 
other words, to be ordinary. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL EXAMPLES OF ORDINARINESS 
The previous Part discussed the meaning of ordinariness, why it matters as a 
measure of racial equality, and how everyday interactions can advance or 
undermine it. This Part discusses how ordinariness has manifested itself, either 
implicitly or explicitly, in constitutional opinions. It highlights the multiple 
pathways that have been taken already by litigants advocating for ordinariness in 
constitutional law. 
 City of Memphis v. Greene50 is a good example. In Greene, black residents chal-
lenged the City of Memphis’s decision to close a street that connected an all-white 
neighborhood to a predominantly black one51 due to “undesirable” traffic from the 
black neighborhood.52 After conducting a traffic study, the City closed the street 
by erecting a physical barrier at precisely the point where the two neighborhoods 
came together in addition to deeding a strip of land to residents in the white 
community.53 The practical effect of the barrier was to block black pedestrian 
traffic into the white neighborhood.54 The black residents claimed that the barrier 
constituted a “badge and incident of slavery” under the Thirteenth Amendment and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Cf. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 97 (critiquing ideas of universalism, which obscure the 
“positivity of group differences”). 
 44. Id. at 99. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 163. 
 47. Id. at 97. 
 48. Id. at 163. 
 49. Cf. Elise C. Boddie, Critical Mass and the Paradox of Colorblind Individualism in 
Equal Protection, J. CONST. L. 781, 797 (2015) (explaining that “having greater minority rep-
resentation enhances the likelihood that individual persons of color will focus on their simi-
larities with individual whites, while low representation leads them to dwell more on racial 
differences”). 
 50. 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 51. Id. at 102–03. 
 52. See Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 416 (2010). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 417. 
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intentional discrimination in violation of equal protection.55 The Court rejected the 
claims.56   
In dissent, Justice Marshall focused not only on the practical consequences of the 
street closing but also on “the racial identifiability and apparent racial meaning of 
the respective neighborhoods” as factors for assessing the plaintiffs’ claims, particu-
larly the white neighborhood’s “history and reputation” as a racially exclusive 
community.57 His analysis shows empathy for the stigmatic and dignity harms that 
the closure imposed on the black residents: 
The majority treats this case as involving nothing more than a dispute 
over a city’s race-neutral decision to place a barrier across a road. My 
own examination of the record suggests, however, that far more is at 
stake here than a simple street closing. The picture that emerges from a 
more careful review of the record is one of a white community, disgrun-
tled over sharing its street with Negroes, taking legal measures to keep 
out “undesirable traffic,” and of a city, heedless of the harm to its Negro 
citizens, acquiescing in the plan.58 
Justice Marshall’s language reflects a sensitive understanding of how the street bar-
rier shaped the everyday lives of the City’s black residents and how it demeaned 
them by physically segregating their neighborhood from that of the neighboring 
white community. In its attentiveness to history and the racial particularities of social 
context, Justice Marshall’s dissent illustrates how something so ostensibly ordinary 
as a street closure could nonetheless deprive blacks of equality. Thus, Greene is in-
structive. It illustrates how incidents that some might perceive as unremarkable deny 
the benefits of the ordinary and identifies these incidents as a form of racial discrimi-
nation.   
Two other examples are instructive. In Dandridge v. Williams,59 Justice 
Marshall—again in dissent—criticized the Court’s decision to reject an equal pro-
tection challenge to a state regulation that capped state allocation of federal public 
assistance regardless of family size and actual need.60 Marshall called for a more 
practical account of the regulation’s impact on large, poor families61 that would focus 
on “the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the 
governmental benefits they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support 
of the classification.”62 His dissent advanced both the letter and spirit of ordinariness 
by focusing on the concrete effects and daily impact of the state’s regulation for low-
income people, reminding the Court that public assistance “provides the stuff that 
sustains . . . children’s lives: food, clothing, shelter.”63 As in Greene, Justice Marshall 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 418. 
 57. Id. at 419. 
 58. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 136 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 59. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 60. Id. at 508–30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 520–21. 
 62. Id. at 521. 
 63. Id. at 522. For a thorough discussion of Justice Marshall’s focus on the practical con-
sequences of constitutional decision making, see Gay Gellhorn, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 
2018] ORDINARINESS AS EQUALITY  65 
 
draws attention to the grittier particularities of inequality and the grinding 
indignities of everyday discrimination.  
O’Shea v. Littleton64 illustrates another use of ordinariness, this time in framing 
constitutional claims. There plaintiffs asserted that they were seeking “equality of 
opportunity and treatment in employment, housing, education, participation in 
governmental decisionmaking and in ordinary day-to-day relations with white 
citizens” and government officials.65 Although the plaintiffs do not define what 
they mean by “ordinary day-to-day relations,” the breadth of their claims points to 
the pervasiveness of discrimination and how it encumbered daily life. Equality here 
is understood in part as a right to the experience of being unmarked and 
unstigmatized in common interactions with fellow citizens. 
Ordinariness as an expression of equality has surfaced more recently in cases 
involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In Obergefell v. 
Hodges,66 Justice Kennedy in his majority opinion invoked ordinariness in 
describing the human costs of denying gay couples state recognition of their 
marriages: 
Leaving the current state of affairs in place would maintain and 
promote instability and uncertainty. For some couples, even an 
ordinary drive into a neighboring State to visit family or friends risks 
causing severe hardship in the event of a spouse’s hospitalization while 
across state lines.67 
In Romer v. Evans68 Justice Kennedy framed the constitutional harms of 
discrimination in ordinariness terms. In Romer, plaintiffs successfully challenged 
a state constitutional amendment that denied any form of protection at the local 
level against discrimination based on sexual orientation.69 Justice Kennedy 
observes the practical, everyday consequences of the amendment: 
These are protections taken for granted by most people either because 
they already have them or do not need them; these are protections 
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and 
endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.70   
This description shows how pervasive discrimination resulting from the state 
constitutional amendment denied gays the freedom of ordinariness that most 
heterosexuals enjoy as a matter of course. By calling attention to the exclusion of 
gay people from a “limitless number of transactions and endeavors,” Kennedy 
emphasizes the breadth and nuances of daily marginalization in everyday activities 
on the basis of sexual orientation.   
                                                                                                                 
 
Jurisprudence of Equal Protection of the Laws and the Poor, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (1994). 
 64. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
 65. Id. at 490–93. 
 66. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 67. Id. at 2607. 
 68. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 69. Id. at 631. 
 70. Id.  
66 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:57 
 
Each of these examples illustrates the possibilities that ordinariness could more 
meaningfully play in constitutional law. They elevate the practical consequences of 
daily discrimination in common social interactions through empathetic reasoning and 
a sensitive appreciation of social context. Obergefell and Romer in particular show 
that the demand for ordinariness occupies constitutional terrain outside of racial 
discrimination. 
As this Part has suggested, there are multiple potential constitutional pathways to 
ordinariness. Equal protection is an obvious source, as are other constitutional pro-
visions. Part III focuses on the Fourth Amendment as a specific barrier to ordinari-
ness.71 However, the goals of ordinariness are not just limited to doctrine or courts. 
Rather, we can deploy all sorts of constitutional actors—by which I mean people 
who are simply invested in making meaning of the Constitution72—in advancing 
ordinariness for socially marginalized groups. Part III briefly discusses one such pos-
sibility. 
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO ORDINARINESS 
One of the most consequential barriers to ordinariness lies in the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment. As Devon Carbado observes, the Fourth 
Amendment plays a prominent role in racial subordination through a litany of cases 
that enable police to stop, frisk, question, search, chase, and arrest black people.73 
The entire infrastructure of Fourth Amendment doctrine “facilitates the space be-
tween stopping black people and killing black people”74 in ways that affect all man-
ner of ordinary activities. The killing of Philando Castile, discussed earlier in this 
Essay,75 makes this painfully clear.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States76 is a key part of this 
constitutional infrastructure. In Whren, the Court concluded that police officers did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment when they used a pretextual traffic stop to search 
for drugs without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that drugs were in the car.77 
A full description of the events that preceded the stop and the stop itself help to il-
lustrate how Whren denies ordinariness: 
On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the 
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a 
“high drug area” of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were 
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aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license 
plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the driver looking 
down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained 
stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time 
—more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn in order 
to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to his right, 
without signaling, and sped off at an “unreasonable” speed. The police-
men followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinder when it 
stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up alongside, and 
[one of the officers] stepped out and approached the driver’s door, iden-
tifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver . . . to put the 
vehicle in park. When [the officer] drew up to the driver’s window, he 
immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be 
crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested, and 
quantities of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the 
vehicle.78 
Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that the stop that led to the 
seizure of the drugs was unconstitutional.79 They argued that the officers lacked a 
“constitutionally adequate” basis to stop the car and search for drugs and that the 
officer’s asserted basis for approaching the car—to warn them about the traffic vio-
lation—was pretextual.80 
Before Whren, the courts of appeals split on the standard for evaluating the use of 
pretextual traffic stops where officers otherwise lacked probable cause. The standard 
adopted by two other circuits called for courts to evaluate whether “a reasonable 
police officer ‘would have’ conducted the search under similar circumstances.”81 On 
the particular facts of Whren, this standard would have required the court to deter-
mine whether a reasonable officer would have bothered to stop a car solely for 
turning without signaling and speeding off. The answer to that question likely would 
have been no. Most police officers probably have better things to do. 
Petitioners pressed the Court to adopt the “reasonable officer” standard on 
grounds that it was more protective of civilians.82 They observed that “total compli-
ance with traffic and safety rules [was] nearly impossible” because “the use of auto-
mobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated.”83 Consider some examples of traffic 
safety violations: “driving too slowly,” driving too closely, using a “loud or unnec-
essary horn,” and driving at a speed that is greater than what is “reasonable and 
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prudent.”84 As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) observed in its amicus 
brief in support of the petitioners, “[w]hether intentionally or not, virtually everyone 
violates the traffic laws at one point or another.”85 Thus, a standard that allowed 
officers to make pretextual traffic stops would eviscerate the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment, because an officer could “invariably . . . catch any motorist in a 
technical violation.”86  
There was another obvious problem. A decision that validated the pretextual use 
of traffic stops, petitioners warned, would exacerbate the problem87 of racial profil-
ing.88 Although Whren would apply to any motorist, the brunt of an adverse ruling 
would be borne by blacks and other racially marginalized groups.89  
This prediction proved to be accurate. In the years since Whren, racial profiling 
has continued to be a persistent problem, but with very little constitutional recourse. 
A New York Times analysis of “tens of thousands of traffic stops and years of arrest 
data” in Greensboro, North Carolina, for example, “uncovered wide racial differ-
ences in measure after measure of police conduct.”90 Blacks were pulled over for 
traffic violations “at a rate far out of proportion with their share of the local driving 
population.”91 The analysis also revealed that officers “used their discretion to search 
black drivers or their cars more than twice as often as white motorists 
—even though they found drugs and weapons significantly more often when the 
driver was white.”92 The same pattern occurred across the rest of the state and in 
other jurisdictions across the country.93 The human consequences of these stops are 
significant. For example, blacks have been killed by police after being “pulled over 
for minor traffic infractions: a broken brake light, a missing front license plate, and 
failure to signal a lane change.”94  
Return to the facts of Whren. Just what was it about the “youthful occupants” 
driving a car with temporary plates who had stopped at an intersection for “more than 
20 seconds,” with the driver looking down at the lap of the passenger that “aroused 
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suspicion”?95 There are a number of possible innocent explanations. Maybe the car 
was new (hence the temporary plates). Maybe they stopped longer than necessary at 
the stop sign because they were lost. Maybe the driver was looking at the passenger’s 
lap because the passenger had a map. Maybe they stopped because they thought they 
forgot something.  
Or maybe the car’s occupants just “looked suspicious” to the officers because they 
were black.96 (Would they have stopped the car if the youth were white and driving 
through a white neighborhood?) 
The problem with Whren is that it constitutionalizes racialized suspicion of ordi-
nary behavior. It gives police officers license to use minor infractions to justify pre-
textual stops in ways that target blacks. Under the auspices of supposedly race neutral 
police practices, Whren facilitates presumptions of black criminality for otherwise 
common conduct. It is an example of the kind of constitutional decision that frus-
trates the ability of blacks to engage in the kinds of everyday activities and behaviors 
that whites typically can do as a matter of course. 
The kinds of stops that Whren allows can have lasting effects on one’s self-es-
teem, sense of safety, and other markers of physical and emotional well-being. 
Consider what happened in 2013 to Rufus Scales, a black man, who was pulled over 
in Greensboro for minor traffic violations that included expired plates.97 Because 
Scales was uncertain whether to get out of the car, he reached over to prevent his 
younger brother from opening the passenger door.98 The officer tasered Scales and 
dragged him, paralyzed, from the car, giving him a split lip and a chipped tooth.99 
Years later his brother would not leave the house without a “hand-held video camera 
and a business card with a toll-free number for legal help.”100 If the police approach, 
Rufus Scales “instinctively turns away.”101 This encounter may be more severe than 
is typical. But the pervasiveness and frequency of police stops, coupled with aware-
ness of their potential deadly consequences, instills a particularly intense fear of the 
police among black people.102 That fear conditions a set of responses—running away, 
for example—that we should not reflexively presume to be suspicious, evasive be-
havior.  
What can be done to advance ordinariness outside the doctrinal confines of the 
Fourth Amendment? We can start with police regulations. The District of Columbia 
police officers who instigated the stop in Whren were subject to a departmental regu-
lation prohibiting plainclothes officers or officers in unmarked cars from making 
traffic stops unless the traffic violation was “so grave as to pose an immediate threat 
to the safety of others.”103 Similar kinds of regulations could limit the kind of citizen-
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police encounters that endanger black lives. We should also limit policies and prac-
tices that criminalize black and Latino communities, such as aggressive stop and frisk 
policies104 and “broken windows” policing that targets minor street infractions for 
enforcement.105  
CONCLUSION: PUTTING ORDINARINESS TO WORK THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION 
The goal of ordinariness is for people of color to be able to take their place in the 
world of the mundane, to be able to do the kinds of things in the course of the 
everyday that many whites take for granted. Although this Essay has focused on the 
experiences of black people, it has demonstrated that this project could apply to other 
socially marginalized groups.106  
Some may resist the framework of ordinariness because it is too focused on 
everyday social interactions. They might argue that we should concentrate instead 
on rights that are more tangible, more textually supported and more immediately 
consequential.107 To the extent that the project engages courts, there are also ques-
tions about how to construct appropriate decisional rules that would advance ordi-
nariness in constitutional decisions, a subject that I have not explored here.108 
The doctrinal limitations are also substantial. A good part of constitutional law 
more or less is constitutive of the racial caste system. Equal protection, for example, 
has legitimized a superstructure of inequality, limiting the possibilities for ordinary 
racial interactions.109 I have already discussed the problems with the Fourth 
Amendment, which sustains and reinforces blacks’ perpetual state of otherness. 
Thus, there are significant doctrinal headwinds. 
Still, these barriers need not deny ordinariness all normative possibilities. As 
Lawrence Sager has argued, just because a norm is underenforced does not mean that 
it is, or should be regarded as, conceptually invalid.110 Norms can still bind other 
                                                                                                                 
 
supra note 80, at *1–2. 
 104. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (enjoining stop and 
frisk policies and practices). 
 105. See Jonathan Oberman & Kendea Johnson, Broken Windows: Restoring Social Order 
or Damaging and Depleting New York’s Poor Communities of Color?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 
931 (2016). 
 106. See infra Part II. 
 107. As Lawrence Sager has observed, “there is an important distinction between a state-
ment which describes an ideal which is embodied in the Constitution and a statement which 
attempts to translate such an ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues.” 
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978). 
 108. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the 
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658–67 (2005) (describing the factors that “lead the Court to 
adopt a decision rule that varies significantly from the constitutional operative provision”). 
 109. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007) (striking down voluntary, race-specific policies that sought to limit the impact of resi-
dential segregation by promoting integration in public schools). 
 110. Lawrence Sager argued as such: 
[C]onstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should 
be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits . . . By “legally 
2018] ORDINARINESS AS EQUALITY  71 
 
governmental actors, such as administrative agencies, legislators, and private citi-
zens.111 Indeed, the benefit of calling for a norm is that it can influence an array of 
public and private decisions without having to sort out all the doctrinal particulars.  
Thus, the problems are difficult and longstanding. None of these challenges, how-
ever, diminish the significance of the demand for ordinariness and the desire just to 
be. The hope for ordinariness is integral to the future of the Constitution. Only by 
attending to the experiences of the everyday can we make its equality guarantees 
meaningful. 
                                                                                                                 
 
valid,” I mean that the unenforced margins of underenforced norms should have 
the full status of positive law which we generally accord to the norms of our 
Constitution, save only that the federal judiciary will not enforce these margins. 
Thus, the legal powers or legal obligations of government officials which are 
subtended in the unenforced margins of underenforced constitutional norms are 
to be understood to remain in full force.  
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